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 
Abstract—The microgrids (MGs) have emerged as an 
ideal platform to integrate distributed energy resources 
(DER’S) in a distribution network. However, the 
intermittent nature of DER’s poses a new challenge of 
energy balance within a microgrid. Trading energy among 
the microgrids has emerged as a well-suited solution. 
Therefore, we have proposed a novel method for fair and 
stable energy sharing among microgrid clusters with 
minimum information overhead. The novelty of the 
proposed method lies within the seller level game and 
introduction of a new pricing mechanism. The concept of 
an aggregator is used as a mediator between the trading 
parties. Depending on the priority factor, each buyer MG 
decides its strategy for energy demand from the surplus 
using a non-cooperative game theory based algorithm. 
The interests of seller MGs are protected by allowing them 
to decide the amount of energy they want to share out of 
their total surplus. To avoid the selfish behaviour of any 
buyer MG, an algorithm is used by the energy market 
operator which verifies the strategies submitted by buyer 
MGs before releasing set points to the generators. Apart 
from fairness and stability, the extensive numerical study 
confirms the ascendancy of the proposed method. 
 
Index Terms—Distributed energy resources (DER’s), 
energy trading, game theory, microgrids, multiple 





BAA             Buyer Aggregator Agent 
DERs            Distributed Energy Resources 
DG                Distributed Generation 
EMO             Energy Market Operator 
FGA              Field Generation Agent 
LA                Load Agent  
FLA              Field Load Agent 
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GA                Generation Agent 
GT                Game Theory  
MAS             Multi Agent System 
MEMA         Microgrid Energy Management Agent 
MG               Microgrid 
NE                Nash Equilibrium 
SAA             Seller Aggregator Agent 
 
NOMENCLATURE   
 
𝒩   Set of N MGs in a distributed network 
𝐺     Energy generated during given fixed time interval 
𝐿    Essential load demand of 𝑖th MG   
𝑃     Index set of all seller MGs 
𝐿     Updated energy consumption by 𝑖th seller MG   
𝑄     Index set of all buyer MGs 
𝐸 ,    Excess energy available with 𝑖th seller MG 
𝐸 ,
∗    Excess energy available with 𝑖th seller MG after 
adjusting its load consumption 
𝐸 ,    Energy requirement of 𝑖th buyer MG 
𝐸    Total energy requirement of all buyer MGs 
𝐸    Total excess energy available from all seller MGs 
before adjusting their load consumption 
𝐸∗    Total excess energy available from all seller MGs 
after upgrading their individual load demand  
𝜌     Per unit cost of energy decided by BAA 
𝐺      Grid selling price 
𝐺     Grid buying price 
𝐸𝐴     Energy Allocated to 𝑖th buyer MG 
𝑑     Strategy of 𝑖th buyer MG  
𝑧     Preference parameter of  𝑖th seller MG  
𝛾     Priority Factor of 𝑖th buyer MG 
𝜇     A weight factor 
𝐶    Total cost incurred to the BAA for buying energy on 
behalf of all buyer MGs 
𝐶   The number of contributions recorded by 𝑖th buyer 
MG till present interval 
𝐷    The load demand of 𝑖th buyer MG in the present 
interval 
𝐶   The total number of contributions recorded by EMO     
till present interval 
𝐷    Load demand of all buyer MGs in the present 
interval 
𝜗     A small positive value  
ℎ     Energy height 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
HE penetration of distributed generation (DG) at 
distribution network level is increasing in almost all 
countries worldwide. The distributed energy resources (DERs) 
basically consist of solar photovoltaic (PV) modules, small 
wind turbines (WTs), electricity storage and controllable 
loads. The carbon emission-less operation along with free and 
ample availability makes these technologies more relevant and 
popular in modern days, especially under current energy 
scenario. These technologies are expected to play a significant 
role in the future electricity supply [1]. Since DERs are 
located in close vicinity of the loads, the power quality and 
reliability of electricity supplied by them will improve 
substantially [2]-[4]. The integration of DERs in the 
distribution network will further reduce the line losses and the 
need for rapid grid expansion. A microgrid has emerged as an 
ideal platform for integrating DERs in a local distribution 
network [3] [4]. However, controlling a large number of DERs 
creates a huge challenge for operating and controlling the 
microgrid safely and efficiently especially if non-dispatchable 
DERs such as PV or wind are involved [1]. Due to the 
presence of non-dispatchable DERs, there always exists a 
problem of demand-supply mismatch in a microgrid. One 
possible solution to tackle this problem is to install diesel 
generators or to use large scale centralized storage devices. 
However, emissions due to diesel and operating cost of 
storage devices are much higher than DERs, therefore, it is 
ideal to look for an alternative smart mechanism to deal with 
the energy imbalance problem faced by the microgrids [5].  
Several recent papers investigates energy management in 
the multi-microgrid clusters include [6]-[22] and the 
references therein. The autonomous microgrids with the 
independent operator can exchange energy among themselves 
rather than trading with the main grid. This operating scenario 
creates a new energy market in a distributed network with 
multiple microgrids. Thus, there is a need to design a 
computational framework and control strategies for smart 
microgrids to facilitate energy trading among them.  
A. Related Work 
Due to inherent characteristics such as reactivity, pro-
activeness and social ability, multi-agent-systems (MAS) are 
used in power engineering applications especially in multi-
microgrid systems [5]-[7]. The fundamental concepts and 
approaches related to the multi-agent systems that are 
appropriate to power engineering applications are discussed in 
[23] along with a comprehensive review of the applications for 
which MAS are being investigated. The guidance and 
recommendations on how MAS can be designed and 
implemented is given in [24]. Kumar Nunna et al. [6] used a 
MAS based two - level architecture for DER’s management in 
intelligent microgrids.  In the proposed mechanism buyers and 
sellers are matched using a naïve auction algorithm. This 
mechanism works only if there are an equal number of buyer 
and seller MGs present in the market. Another drawback is 
that it requires a centralized auctioneer. T. Logenthiran et al. 
in [7] proposed a three - stage algorithm which assumes that  
TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF VARIOUS GT BASED ENERGY TRADING METHODS 
Aspects Methods 
SLMF MLMF CB PI Baseline Proposed 
Seller level game Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Buyer level game Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Priority of buyers No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Distributed at 
local level 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Pricing Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Existence of NE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Elimination of 
selfish behaviour 
No No Yes Yes No Yes 
SLMF: Single leader multi followers [15], MLMF: Multi-leader multi-
follower [17], CB: Contribution based [18], PI: Priority index based [19], 
Baseline: Trading with the main grid. 
 
each microgrid and lumped load has market price forecasting 
capability and they bid at their forecasted market prices. 
However, an accurately forecasted market price is required for 
each player to ensure success in the energy market.  
Several game theoretical strategies were also proposed in 
[8]-[22] for energy management in a network of multiple 
MGs. Each microgrid needs to decide its local strategy on how 
to maintain local supply/demand balance as well as market 
strategy on how to interact with the neighboring microgrids. 
Under such circumstances, game theory found suitable to 
model and design strategies for energy trading among smart 
Microgrids [5]. A cooperative power dispatching in 
interconnected microgrids is presented in [8] by Mohammad 
Fathi et al. and incorporated impact of demand uncertainty in 
[9]. In [8] and [9] authors considered that the microgrids are 
controlled by a centralized operator which may not be a case 
always. The microgrids can operate as autonomous entities as 
well. The study in [10] has considered a hierarchical structure 
for interactions between the main grid and the cluster of 
microgrids. The direct energy trading among microgrids is 
explored in [11] and [12]. Matamoros et al. [11] proposed an 
energy trading mechanism for islanded MGs and D. Gregoratti 
et al. [12] have proposed a distributed convex optimization 
framework for energy trading between islanded microgrids 
without giving any due consideration to the self-interests of 
multiple MGs. 
In recent work, Hao Wang et al. [13] suggested an incentive 
mechanism using Nash bargaining theory to encourage 
proactive energy trading and fair benefit sharing among 
microgrids. W. Saad et al. used the coalitional game theory in 
[14] for energy scheduling among multiple microgrids with 
the goal of minimizing average power loss in the distribution 
network. However, this mechanism suffers from the problem 
of large communication overhead. Also, the issues of fairness 
as well as proactive participation of microgrids are not 
addressed. Leader-follower strategies for energy management 
of multi-microgrids are proposed in [15]-[17]. W. Tushar et al. 
[15] suggested a non-cooperative Stackelberg game between 
the residential units and the shared facility controller in order 
to explore how both entities can benefit from their energy 
trading with each other and the grid. Asimakopoulou et al. 
[16] and J. Lee et al. [17] have presented interactions between 
the main grid and microgrids in hierarchical order. However in 
T
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[17], since all buyers are bidding the same value at NE, 
proactive participation especially from buyer MGs is not 
ensured. This is because, the excess energy is distributed 
among the buyer MGs proportional to their bid placed.  
Sangdon Park et al. [18] have designed a contribution-based 
energy-trading mechanism among MGs in a competitive 
market. However, calculation of contribution factor is not 
defined. This is a non-pricing based approach. This work is 
extended in [19] by suggesting a priority index for buyer MGs 
based on past contributions and local load demand. In [18] and 
[19], authors have designed strategies only for buyer MGs 
without giving any due consideration to the interests of seller 
MGs. Also, non-inclusion of pricing makes these studies 
practically less attractive. For real time implementation of any 
trading mechanism, a suitable pricing need to be incorporated. 
A brief comparison of various game theory based energy 
trading methods reported in the literature and close to our 
proposed work is presented in table I.  
B. Our Contribution 
This paper presents a novel approach to overcome the 
shortcomings of the existing work reported in [17], [18] & 
[19]. In the proposed method, we have designed a seller level 
game to protect the interests of seller MGs. We have also 
introduced a simple pricing mechanism to avoid complex 
bidding algorithms. This makes proposed method practically 
more relevant. It is clear from table I that the proposed method 
overcomes the limitations of previously reported work and 
qualifies in all aspects considered.   
Unlike the most reported work, the computational 
framework designed for energy management in a multi-
microgrid system should consider the priority of its members 
while sharing energy. The self-interests of individual 
microgrids should be protected and fairness must be ensured 
as each microgrid is a rational player. In order to sustain 
energy trading, an efficient incentive mechanism must be in 
place to encourage proactive energy trading among microgrids 
rather than trading with the main grid. Keeping all this in 
mind, we have designed strategies for both buyer and seller 
MGs. The suggested novel pricing mechanism also reduces 
the burden of large communication overhead.  
The microgrids with deficiency of energy register 
themselves as buyers at BAA. BAA is an aggregator working 
on behalf of the cluster of buyer microgrids. Based on energy 
requirements of buyers, grid buying, and grid selling prices, 
the BAA decides the optimal bid value for energy purchase 
from the neighborhood cluster of seller MGs. Looking at the 
bid placed by BAA, MGs with surplus energy chooses its 
strategy i.e. adjusts its own energy consumption and makes 
remaining energy available for sell. SAA will then aggregate 
this available energy for sell and informs the BAA. BAA 
forwards this information to all buyer MGs. Based on the 
priority factor, each buyer MG calculates its strategy for 
buying energy from available surplus and submits it to Energy 
Market Operator (EMO). The EMO will then verify the 
strategy submitted and will allocate the same amount of 
energy to the buyer MGs who follows NE and it is 
proportional to their priority factor. This mechanism ensures 
stable operation of the proposed system and protects interests 
of both the seller as well as buyer MGs. 
The main contributions of this work are summarized as 
below: 
 Inclusion of  strategies for seller and buyer MGs: 
Unlike the reported work in the literature as shown 
in table I, we have designed strategies for both 
seller as well as buyer MGs keeping in mind their 
individual interests to trade energy among 
themselves rather than trading with the main grid. 
A priority factor is being calculated for each buyer 
MG which helps in prioritizing the buyers while 
sharing excess energy from neighboring seller 
MGs. 
 Protection of seller interests : 
In a seller level game, seller MGs are allowed to 
decide their strategy regarding the amount of 
energy they want to trade out of total surplus after 
adjusting their own energy consumptions. This in 
turn depends on the bid placed by BAA and the 
preference parameter of each seller MG. 
 Simple pricing mechanism : 
Unlike the complex bidding algorithms used in 
literature [6] [7], we have used a simple pricing 
mechanism which makes overall system operation 
simple and reduces communication overhead to 
great extent. This also results into improved utility 
of both seller and buyer MGs.   
 Numerical analysis and discussion: 
The extensive numerical analysis highlights the 
practical applicability and advantages of the 
proposed method.     
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The details 
related to the multi-microgrid cluster model are presented in 
section II. Various strategies for energy trading for both seller, 
as well as buyer MGs along with roles played by BAA and 
EMO, are summarized in section III. Numerical results and 
discussion are given in section IV. Finally, we conclude this 
paper in section V.  
II. MULTI-MICROGRID CLUSTER MODEL 
Consider a smart distributed network of multiple microgrids 
with various intelligent agents as shown in Fig. 1. All the MGs 
are interconnected and can exchange energy among 
themselves and with the main grid through dedicated power 
exchange lines. The necessary communication infrastructure is 
assumed to be present as given in [25], [26]. Let us assume 
that there are N MGs in a distributed network and they belong 
to the set  𝒩. Each 𝑛 ∈ 𝒩 is equipped with DERs such as 
wind, solar PV etc. Each MG 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 can generate energy 𝐺  
during certain fixed time interval of the day. Each MG is 
required to fulfill essential load demand of its consumers  
𝐿 . If 𝐺  > 𝐿  for some MG 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, this 𝑖th MG is 
considered as seller and  𝑃 is set of all such seller MGs 
i.e. 𝑃 = {𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 | 𝐺 > 𝐿 } . If 𝐺 < 𝐿 , this 𝑖th microgrid 
needs to buy extra energy either from seller microgrids or the 
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main grid. This microgrid is termed as a buyer. Let 𝑄 be the 
index set of all such buyer MGs i.e.,  𝑄 =  {𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 |𝐺 <
 𝐿 }. The energy requirement of 𝑖th buyer MG is given as  
 
𝐸 , =  𝐺 −    𝐿           ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑄                                 (1)         
 
and the total energy requirement of all buyer MGs is  
 
𝐸 = ∑ 𝐸 ,∈                                                   (2) 
 
After serving its own essential loads, seller microgrid 𝑖 will 
have excess energy for sell given as 
 
𝐸 , = 𝐺 −    𝐿              ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑃                                    (3) 
 
and the total excess energy available from all seller MGs 
before adjusting their load consumption is  
 
𝐸 = ∑ 𝐸 ,∈                                                              (4) 
 
We assume that each seller microgrid 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 wants to 
manage its energy consumption 𝐿  s. t.  𝐿   ≥   𝐿  so that it 
can sell remainder of its generated energy (𝐺 −   𝐿 ) to the 
buyer MGs or to the main grid using proposed energy trading 
mechanism.  
The excess energy available from 𝑖th seller MG after 
adjusting its load consumption is given as  
 
𝐸 ,
∗ = (𝐺 −  𝐿 )             ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑃                                             (5) 
 
and the total excess energy available from all seller MGs after 
upgrading their individual load demand to 𝐿   is  
 
𝐸∗ = ∑ 𝐸 ,
∗
∈                                                                  (6) 
 
 Here, we have considered  𝐺  and 𝐺  as grid buying and 
grid selling prices respectively. We assume that the unit cost 
of energy that BAA pays to each seller MG is set between 𝐺  
and 𝐺 . Thus, it is clear that each seller MG is more interested 
in selling excess energy 𝐸 ,
∗ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑃    to neighboring buyer 
MGs rather than trading with the main grid. For each buyer 
MG, we will calculate its priority factor based on its historical 
contribution as well as local load demand. 𝛾   denotes priority 
factor of 𝑖th buyer MG. In order to highlight the importance of 
the priority factor, a weight factor µ is used.  
 A typical energy trading scenario, in which a set  𝑄 of buyer 
MGs requests energy from the set 𝑃 of neighboring seller 
MGs via BAA is shown in Fig.1. The BAA gathers the total 
energy demand from all the buyer MGs i.e. 𝐸  . The BAA 
then decides the per unit cost of energy 𝜌  in order to buy 
required energy from seller MGs s.t. 𝐺 ≤  𝜌 ≤  𝐺 . 
Looking at the price placed by BAA, each seller MG then 
adjusts its optimal energy consumption  𝐿 , and makes 
remaining energy 𝐸 ,
∗     ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑃  available for sell and informs 
the EMO and BAA via SAA. The BAA then passes this 
information to all buyer MGs. Depending on the total excess 
energy available for sell 𝐸∗  and individual priority factor,  
 
Fig.1. Proposed system architecture of a distribution network with 
multiple intelligent microgrids. 
 
each buyer MG then decides its strategy 𝑑  to request certain 
fraction of excess energy from EMO using algorithm 1 which 
uses non-cooperative game among buyer MGs. BAA then 
conveys this information to the EMO. After receiving 
strategies from all buyer MGs regarding energy demand, EMO 
uses algorithm 2 to allocate an appropriate amount of energy 
𝐸𝐴  to individual buyer MGs based on the excess energy, 
demand and priority factor of buyer MGs. Therefore, the 
energy trading mechanism depicted in Fig.1 ensures simple, 
fair and stable energy trading among MG clusters. Since, 
demand for energy is the strategy of the buyer MG,  𝑑  is not 
always equal to the actual energy need of the buyer MG 𝑖 i.e. 
𝐸 , .  Each buyer MG decides its strategy 𝑑  on [0, 𝐸 , ] in 
order to maximize its energy allocated  𝐸𝐴 . 
 
A. Utility of Seller MGs 
The total utility achieved by each seller MG 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 from its 
own energy consumption 𝐿  and from selling excess energy 
𝐸 ,
∗  to neighboring buyer MGs is given by,  
 
𝑈 ∈ = 𝑧 ln(1 +  𝐿 ) +  𝜌 (𝐺 −   𝐿 ),   𝑧 > 0                 (7) 
 
In literature the natural logarithm has been used extensively 
to measure user’s satisfaction with decreasing returns [15], 
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[18].  In (7), first part represents the utility that each seller MG 
achieves from its own energy consumption  𝐿 , where 𝑧  is a 
preference parameter [15]. The seller MGs with higher value 
of 𝑧  are more interested in consuming energy to serve  𝐿  as 
compared to the seller MGs with lower value of  𝑧  . The 
second part of (7) gives the revenue that seller MGs can earn 
by trading excess energy with neighboring buyer MGs.  
 Since BAA has no generation capacity; it needs to buy the 
entire energy demand of all buyer MGs either from the seller 
MGs or the main grid. In most of the cases, the main grid sells 
energy at higher rate compared to that from the MGs equipped 
with DERs such as feed – in tariff schemes [15]. Thus, BAA is 
more interested in buying energy on behalf of the entire buyer 
MGs from neighboring cluster of seller MGs at rate 𝜌 and 
remaining, if any from the main grid. The careful selection of 
𝜌 is important. The too small value of  𝜌 i.e. 𝜌 ≤  𝐺  will 
encourage seller MGs to utilize excess energy for its own use 
rather than trading with the neighbors. At the same time too 
high value of 𝜌 i.e. 𝜌 ≥  𝐺  will cost buyers significantly. In 
case, if the energy from the seller MGs is not sufficient to 
fulfill energy demand of buyer MGs, BAA will buy the 
remaining energy from the main grid at  𝐺  .  
 The total cost incurred to the BAA for buying energy on 
behalf of all buyer MGs is given as  
 
𝐶 = ∑ 𝐸 ,
∗
∈ ∗ 𝜌 + 𝐸 −  ∑ 𝐸 ,
∗
∈ ∗ 𝐺            (8) 
 
In (8), the first part shows the total cost while buying 
energy from neighboring seller MGs and the second part 
indicates the cost incurred while buying remaining energy 
from the main grid. The second part also shows that the BAA 
does not buy more than required energy and energy balance 
holds good at all time.  
B. Utility of Buyer MGs 
While deciding utility of buyer MG 𝑈 ∈ , we assume that 
𝑈 ∈  is always a non-negative real valued function. The 
energy requirement of each buyer MG is different; however 
each buyer wants to receive as much energy as possible from 
EMO, limited to the required energy of buyer MG.  Thus, 
utility of buyer MG 𝑖 is defined in terms of the energy 
allocated (𝐸𝐴 ) by EMO. The utility of buyer MGs must be a 
strictly increasing function of     i.e. satisfaction increases 
by the ratio between energy allocated and energy demand 
[18]. Also 𝑈 ∈  must be a concave function of 𝐸𝐴  because 
increasing rate of satisfaction decreases as the energy 
allocated increases. Finally, the energy allocation should also 
directly proportional to the priority factor and depends on the 
weight factor of the priority. Thus, the utility function of buyer 
MG is defined as,  
 
𝑈 ∈ =  𝛾 log  1 +      , 𝑠. 𝑡. 0 ≤  𝐸𝐴  ≤  𝑑            (9) 
 
where, 𝑑  is the strategy of the 𝑖th buyer MG.  
III. STRATEGIES FOR ENERGY TRADING 
In this section we will discuss the strategies adopted by 
BAA, EMO, seller and buyer MGs in order to maximize their 
utilities. The aim of each seller MG is to adjust its own energy 
consumption to maximize its utility in (7) by looking at the 
price placed by the BAA. The goal of the BAA is to minimize 
per unit cost of energy while purchasing energy from seller 
MGs. At the same time, each buyer MG wants to acquire as 
much energy as possible to fulfill its local load demand. The 
roles played by BAA and EMO are also discussed in detail.   
A. Buyer Strategies 
In order to sustain energy trading among neighborhood 
MGs, there must exist some incentive mechanism for the 
participating MGs which will encourage local energy trading. 
Thus, we have used the priority factor [19] to prioritize buyer 
MGs while distributing excess energy. 
 Calculation of Priority Factor 
For each buyer MG, we will calculate its priority factor 
𝛾   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑄 using (10).  
 
𝛾 =   +                                                          (10) 
 
In (10), 𝐶  represents the number of contributions recorded 
by a buyer MG till present interval, 𝐶  is the total number 
of contributions recorded by EMO till current interval, 𝐷  
gives the load demand from buyer MG 𝑖 and 𝐷  represents 
load demand of all buyer MGs in the current interval. The first 
part in (10) measures the contributions made by MG in past by 
selling its excess energy to neighboring MGs and second part 
quantifies the load demand in each buyer MG. Since equal 
importance is given to both past contributions made as well as 
local load demand, MGs gets encouraged to trade energy 
among themselves rather than trading with the main grid. We 
have also used a weight factor 𝜇 (𝜇 > 0) which indicates 
importance of priority factor during energy trading. It is 
dynamic in nature and set by EMO. However, in this study, 
we set value of 𝜇 as 1.5 for all buyer MGs. 
 Non-cooperative Game among Buyer MGs 
Each buyer MG is a rational player and having different 
energy demands. Also, each one is trying to acquire as much 
energy as possible from the local energy market via EMO. 
Thus, the utility functions of all buyer MGs is given as, 
 
𝑢(𝑑) =  ∑ 𝛾 log(1 + )∈                           (11) 
 




≤  𝐸∗  
 
where 𝑑  is the demand strategy of 𝑖th buyer MG. The 
competition among buyer MGs is formulated as a non-
cooperative continuous strategic form of game  𝐺 =
( 𝑑 , 𝑢 )  . Here |Q| is the total number of buyer MGs and 𝑢  
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is a payoff function and 𝑑 = [0 , 𝐸 , ] is the strategy for 
each buyer MG  𝑖 ∈ 𝑄.  
In order to show the existence of the NE in buyer level 
game, we need to show the continuity and quasi- concavity of 
the utility function [30]. As the objective function is 
continuous and the strategic domain is convex, it is clear that 
the utility function 𝑢  𝑑 , 𝑑 … . , 𝑑  is continuous 
in (𝑑 , 𝑑 … . , 𝑑 ).  
Now to prove quasi-concavity, for a buyer MG 𝑖, fix the 
other buyer MGs strategies  𝑑 =  𝑑̅ . Let us consider three 
arbitrary strategies   𝑑", 𝑑̅ , and 𝑑   such that    𝑑"  <  𝑑̅ <  𝑑  . 
To prove quasi-concavity of the utility function in  𝑑 , it is 
enough to show [18]  
 
min 𝑢 𝑑", 𝑑̅ , 𝑢 𝑑 , 𝑑̅   ≤ 𝑢 𝑑̅ , 𝑑̅  . 
 
If any one of the utilities 𝑢 𝑑", 𝑑̅ , and 𝑢 𝑑 , 𝑑̅  is 
zero, then the proof is done. Therefore, now we will consider a 
nontrivial case when both of them are nonzero. 
Case A: 𝑢 𝑑̅ , 𝑑̅ = 0 
In this case 𝑢 𝑑 , 𝑑̅ = 0 and therefore the 
inequality holds. 
Case B: 𝑢 𝑑̅ , 𝑑̅ = 𝑑̅  
In this case, it can be proved that 𝑢 𝑑", 𝑑̅ =  𝑑" by 
the similar way in Lemma 1 [18], therefore 
        min 𝑢 𝑑", 𝑑̅ , 𝑢 𝑑 , 𝑑̅   ≤  𝑑" < 𝑢 𝑑̅ , 𝑑̅  . 
Case C: 0 < 𝑢 𝑑̅ , 𝑑̅ <  𝑑̅  . 
  By Lemma 1 [18], 𝑢 𝑑̅ , 𝑑̅  ≥   𝑢 𝑑 , 𝑑̅  which 
completes the proof for the quasi-concavity of the utility 
function in  𝑑  . By using Lemma 2 [18] and Theorem 2.2 in 
[30], the existence of NE can be directly shown as below.  
Let us consider 𝑑∗ =  {𝑑∗ , … . , 𝑑∗ } is a NE of the proposed 
non-cooperative Game among Buyer MGs, which is given by 
 
𝑑∗ = min 𝜓∗  𝛾 , 𝐸 ,  
 
Where 𝜓∗  is a number satisfying  ∑ 𝑑∗∈ =   𝐸
∗  .  
Proof: for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑄, we need to show 
 
𝑢 ( 𝑑∗, 𝑑∗ ) ≥  𝑢 ( 𝑑 , 𝑑∗ )        ∀𝑑  ∈ [0, 𝐸 , ] . 
 
     As  ∑ 𝑑∗∈ = 𝐸
∗   gives  𝑢 (𝑑∗) =  𝑑∗   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑄  . 
 
If  𝑑  ≤ 𝑑∗, it can be observed that  
 
𝑢 ( 𝑑 , 𝑑∗ )  ≤  𝑑  ≤  𝑑∗ =  𝑢 ( 𝑑∗,  𝑑∗ ) . 
 
The case remain to prove is that when  𝑑  >  𝑑∗ . If 𝑑∗ =
 𝐸 ,  , then there is no strategy larger than  𝑑
∗, then it remains 
the case  𝑑∗ =  𝜓∗  𝛾  .  
 Suppose there are at least two buyer MGs of which utility is 
less than the amount of their own strategy; i.e., 
 
∃𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑄 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑢 (𝑑∗) < 𝑑∗ and  𝑢 (𝑑∗) < 𝑑∗ . 
Then  𝑑∗  is a unique NE solution in the proposed buyer MG 
level game [18]. 
Proof:  Let us suppose there exists another NE, say 𝑑 =
 {𝑑 , … , 𝑑 } . If there is 𝑥 ∈ 𝑄 such that  𝑢 (𝑑 ) < 𝑑∗ , then 
by using proposition 2 [18], it is not a NE as 𝑢 (𝑑∗ , 𝑑 ) =
 𝑑∗  .  If there is 𝑥 ∈ 𝑄 such that 𝑢 (𝑑 ) > 𝑑∗ , then there has 
to exists 𝑦 ∈ 𝑄 such that 𝑢 (𝑑 ) < 𝑑∗    because  𝑢 (𝑑∗) =
 𝑑∗   for all 𝑛 ∈ 𝑄 and ∑ 𝑑∗ = 𝐸∗∈ ; is not a NE either.  
Therefore it is concluded 𝑢 (𝑑 ) =  𝑑∗   for all  ∈ 𝑄 .  
Also, if ∑ 𝑑∈  <  ∑ 𝑑
∗
∈  , then ∑ 𝑑  <∈  𝐸
∗  which is 
a contradiction. Therefore, it remains the case when 
∑ 𝑑  ∈  ≥  ∑ 𝑑
∗
∈  . Since 𝑑 ≠  𝑑
∗, there is 𝑖 ∈ 𝑄 such that 
𝑑∗  <  𝑑  . Let  𝑑̅  be a strategy between them, i.e., 𝑑∗ < 𝑑̅ <
𝑑  .  Since 𝑢 (𝑑∗, 𝑑 ) =  𝑢 (𝑑 , 𝑑 ) = 𝑑∗ , it can be observed 
from the quasi–concavity of the utility function that 
𝑢 𝑑̅ , 𝑑 =  𝑑∗. Also, 0 < 𝑢 (𝑑̅ , 𝑑 ) < 𝑑̅ . Now, by using 
Lemma 1[18], we can show that 𝑢 𝑑̅ , 𝑑̅  > 𝑢 𝑑 , 𝑑̅ , 
which also contradicts with the assumption made i.e. 𝑑  is an 
NE.   
Thus, there exists only a unique NE in the proposed non-
cooperative game among buyer MGs. The algorithm 1 gives 
the NE solution i.e. the optimal strategy for each buyer MG. 
 
Algorithm 1 : Optimal Strategy for Buyer MG 
Initialization:  
 Collect energy requirements from all buyer MGs 
along with their priority factors i.e. 𝛾. 
 Arrange all buyer MGs and their 𝛾 vector by the 
value of  ,  in ascending order.  
 Initialize filling index j = 1;  N= |Q| ; 
Filling width  w = 𝛾
∈
 ;  
Energy remaining  𝐸 = 𝐸∗ ; 
Energy height η = 0; 
𝐸 , = ∞ and 𝛾 = 1 for handling exceptional case 
While {𝐸   > 0} 
 if  {𝑤 , −  𝜂 < 𝐸 } 
 𝐸 = 𝐸 − 𝑤  
𝐸 ,
𝛾
−  𝜂 ;  
𝜂 =
,  ; 𝑤 = 𝑤 −  𝛾  ; 𝑑 = 𝐸 ,  ; 
                         j = j + 1 ; 
 else  
𝜂 =  𝜂 +   ; 𝐸 = 0 ; 
                         for k = j: N 
                         𝑑 = 𝜂 𝛾 ; 
End 
Rearrange the optimal strategy of each buyer microgrid in 
original order.  
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 Role of BAA 
The BAA is acting as the representative of all buyer MGs. 
The main function of BAA is to decide per unit cost of 
energy, 𝜌  in order to buy required energy 𝐸 = ∑ 𝐸 ,∈  
from seller MGs s.t. 𝐺 ≤  𝜌 ≤  𝐺 . The BAA has no 
control over 𝐺  and 𝐺 , thus it has to adjust its own buying 
price 𝜌 to minimize (8).  The objective of the BAA is given as, 
 
                                  𝐶                                           (12) 
 
Now, using the first order optimality condition of BAA’s 
objective function in (8), we have 
 
                                 = 0                                              (13) 






   
                
               
                                     (14) 
where 𝜗 > 0 is a small value to keep 𝜌 more than 𝐺 .  
 
B. Seller Strategies 
We have assumed that seller MGs do not have any storage 
capacity therefore each seller MG is interested in selling its 
excess energy 𝐸 ,
∗ = (𝐺 −  𝐿 )   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑃   at suitable price 
𝜌 to the BAA after adjusting its own energy consumption  
𝐿  .  Thus, the objective of each seller MG is  
 
𝑈 ∈      , 
 
               s.t. 𝐿   ≥  𝐿  .              (15) 
 
from (7) and (15), the first order differential condition for 
maximum utility can be derived as  
 
      
 
−  𝜌 = 0                 (16) 
 
Solving (16) further gives 
 
                           𝐿 =   – 1    .                              (17) 
              
From (17), we can observe the decision making process of 
each seller MG is influenced by the price set by BAA. Care 
should be taken such that 𝑧  is sufficiently large so that (17) 
always possesses a positive value for all resulting values of  
𝐿 . Also, 𝐿  should be at least as large as its minimum essential 
load. From (17) it is also clear that the energy consumption 𝐿  
of each seller MG is inversely proportional to the price per 
unit of energy set by BAA. Hence, higher value of  𝜌, 
encourages seller MGs to sell more energy by reducing its 
own energy consumption and vice-versa.  
 
Algorithm 2 : EMO Energy Allocation Algorithm  
Initialization:  
 Collect data of all buyer MGs along with their 
strategy vector d and  𝛾. N = |Q| 
 Arrange the buyer MGs and their corresponding 
strategy vector d and 𝛾 by the value of    in 
ascending order. 
 Initialize the filling indexes j = 1 and k = 2, filling 
width w =  𝛾 , energy remaining 𝐸 = 𝐸∗ , 
energy height h =    , energy allocated vector  of all 
buyers  EA = 0, 𝑑 = ∞ and 𝛾 = ∞ for 
handling exception case 
While {𝐸 > 0 } 
 if  { >  } & { 𝑤 −  ℎ < 𝐸 },  
𝐸 = 𝐸 −  𝑤 −  ℎ ; 
𝑤 = 𝑤 +  𝛾  ; ℎ = ; k = k + 1;  
 else if { ≤   } & { 𝑤 −  ℎ < 𝐸 }, 
𝐸 = 𝐸 −  𝑤 −  ℎ ; 
𝐸𝐴 = 𝑑 ;  w = 𝑤 −  𝛾  ; ℎ = ; 
 j = j + 1; 
 else , 
ℎ = ℎ +  
𝐸
𝑤
 ;  𝐸 = 0; 
for  i = 𝑗 ∶ 𝑘 
𝐸𝐴 = 𝛾  (ℎ −  ) ; 
End  
Rearrange the allocated energy EA in original order and 
distribute among buyer microgrids. 
C. Role of EMO 
The main function of EMO is to distribute excess energy 
available from seller MGs among buyer MGs. The EMO 
wants to maximize the social welfare (SW) i.e. the sum of the 
satisfaction of all buyer MGs. Let 𝑈 (𝐸𝐴 ) is the satisfaction 
of buyer 𝑖 from EMO’s view. ∑ 𝑈 (𝐸𝐴 )∈  is the SW of the 
system. Now the optimization problem to allocate energy to 
the buyer MGs is given as  
 
∑ 𝛾∈ log 1 +                                                   (18) 
s.t.   0 ≤  𝐸𝐴   ≤ 𝑑                   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑄   
𝐸𝐴
 ∈
 ≤  𝐸∗  
By using Theorem (1) in [18], the optimal energy allocation 
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𝐸𝐴∗ =  
ℎ𝛾 −  𝑑            𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑠 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 < 𝑑
𝑑                     𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑠 ≥  𝑑
0                                                     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
          (19) 
 
Here ℎ is the real number such that ∑ 𝐸𝐴∗ =  𝐸∗  
The above problem is the different version of water filling 
problem in [29]. The algorithm 2 gives the optimal solution of 
the above problem using modified water filling algorithm 
given in [18]. 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
For numerical case study purpose, we have considered a 
distributed network of six interconnected MGs. The 24 hours 
of a day are divided into 96 blocks of 15 min each. However, 
EMO is supposed to decide this time interval depending on the 
operating circumstances. The selection of short duration is 
normally preferred as the amount of energy available for sell 
is directly proportional to the trading interval. During this 
fixed time interval, we assume that demand and supply are 
constant. The first 5 minutes are designated as discussion 
period for inter-agent communications for negotiating energy 
trading for next interval. The result of these negotiations is a 
set of mutual contracts which will be implemented in the next 
trading interval. The system data used for first 4 time blocks 
are given in Table II. The values of 𝐺  and 𝐺  are set as 0.8 
USA cents/kWh and 2.4 USA cents/kWh respectively [17]. 
The value of 𝜇 is fixed at 1.5.  For this study, preference 




In block 1, MGs 1, 2 and 6 have generated energy more 
than their minimum loads requirements whereas, MGs 3, 4 
and 5 have generated energy less than their minimum load. 
Therefore, MGs 3, 4 and 5 register themselves as buyers at 
BAA and forms a cluster of buyer MGs whereas MGs 1, 2 and 
6 register themselves as sellers at SAA and forms a cluster of 
seller MGs. The BAA has the information regarding buyer 
energy requirements, seller generations, and their preference 
parameters. Based on this information, BAA calculates bid 
value on behalf of all the buyers using (14) which is 1.90 
cents/kWh during the first interval. By looking at the price set 
by BAA, seller MGs adjusts their energy consumption and 
puts remaining energy for sell. During first interval MGs 1, 2 
and 6 have updated their energy consumption to 72.74 kW, 
64.79 kW and 75.32 kW respectively and hence total excess 
energy available for trade is 57.15 kW.  
In order to sustain energy trading, EMO calculates priority 
factor for each buyer MG. Based on priority factor, each buyer 
decides its optimal strategy to buy energy from the surplus. 
During the first interval no past contributions are recorded, 
hence the second part of (10) only dominates. During this 
interval, MG with more load demand will get more priority. It 
can be observed that MG 4 having highest load demand of 50 
kW gets higher priority, i.e. 0.5 and MG 5 is having lowest 
load demand gets lower priority of 0.2. Based on total energy 
remaining for sell and priority factor, each buyer calculates its 
optimal strategy for buying energy from the surplus. In block 
1, MGs 3, 4 and 5 calculates their optimal strategies as 15.46 
kW, 33.27 kW and 8.42 kW respectively using algorithm 1. 
Once the strategies are calculated by individual buyer MG, it 
will be forwarded to the EMO via BAA. After receiving the 
optimal strategies from individual buyer MG, EMO uses 
TABLE II 


















Set by BAA 
Actual Energy 
Consumption of 














2 50 80 +30 Seller 125 64.79 +15.21 
3 100 70 -30 Buyer - - - 
4 80 30 -50 Buyer - - - 
5 90 70 -20 Buyer - - - 









2 80 140 +60 Seller 135 83.90 +56.10 
3 90 130 +40 Seller 150 93.33 +36.67 
4 110 50 -60 Buyer - - - 
5 120 90 -30 Buyer - - - 









2 60 100 +40 Seller 125 72.53 +27.47 
3 110 50 -60 Buyer - - - 
4 100 80 -20 Buyer - - - 
5 140 140 0 - - - - 









2 100 70 -30 Buyer - - - 
3 70 120 +50 Seller 130 74.14 +45.86 
4 70 100 +30 Seller 140 79.92 +20.08 
5 70 110 +40 Seller 125 71.25 +38.75 
6 120 70 -50 Buyer - - - 
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algorithm 2 to allocate energy to the buyer MGs proportional 
to their priority factor. Since MG 4 is having highest priority 
during first interval, it gets highest allocation of energy from 
the EMO as 33.27 kW. MG 5 is assigned with lower priority 
factor gets lowest energy share of 8.42 kW.  
In block 1, seller MG 6 is having highest preference 
parameter as 145 which in turn indicate its inclination towards 
more self-energy consumption rather than trading with the 
neighboring MGs. MG 6 is having a minimum load of 70 kW 
which it adjusts to 75.32 kW after receiving a bid value of 
1.90 cents/ kWh from the BAA. Similarly, MG 1 and MG 2 
are having preference parameters140 and 125 which in turn 
adjust their energy consumptions to 72.74 kW and 64.79 kW 
from earlier 70 kW and 50 kW respectively.  In block 1, total 
energy demand is 100 kW. However, total available excess 
energy from neighboring seller MGs is only 57.15 kW. Thus, 
BAA requests EMO to buy remaining 42.85 kW of energy 
from the Main grid at  𝐺  rate. 
The overall energy trading scenario during first four blocks 
of the time interval is depicted in table III.  In block 2, MG 2 
and 3 are acting as sellers whereas MG 1, 4, 5 and 6 are acting 
as buyers. Since MG 1 has acted as seller and contributed its 
excess energy in past interval i.e. in block 1, this MG will 
receive more importance in the second interval in terms of 
priority during energy allocation. It is clear that MG 1 receives 
32.47 kW of energy which is higher than rest of the buyer 
MGs. Thus, the proposed mechanism encourages the MGs to 
share excess energy among themselves rather than trading 
with the main grid.    
In block 3, we have two seller MGs and three buyer MGs. 
Since generation and load are equal in MG 5, this MG remains 
energy neutral. In block 4, there are four seller MGs whereas 
buyers are only two. Also, excess energy for sell is around 
121.87 kW which is far more than the buyer’s demand of 80 
kW. Thus, after fulfilling local MGs demand, excess energy of 
41.87 kW will be sold to the main gird at rate 𝐺 . As the 
trading goes on, EMO continues to record the contributions 
made by individual MG which helps it in calculating their 
priority factors in future.  
The number of microgrids versus average convergence time 
for algorithm 1 and algorithm 2 is depicted in figures 2 and 3 
respectively as a number of participating MGs varies from 4 to 
100. However, in most of the practical cases, the number of 
MGs participating in energy trading will be well below 50. All 
simulations are performed on 2.53 GHz Intel core i3 
processor. The average convergence time is a linearly 
increasing function of number of participating MGs. In a case 
of minimum four participating MGs, the average convergence 
time for Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 is 2.1 ms and 2.4 ms    
respectively. Also, in extreme case of 100 participating MGs, 
the average convergence time turns out to be only 0.2 and 0.65 
seconds, respectively. This justifies the selection of 5 minutes 
as discussion period at the beginning of the trading.  
The Fig. 4 illustrates the effect of the variation of the weight 
factor  𝜇 on the energy allocated to the buyer MGs in interval 
2. When the weight factor is zero, the equal amount of energy 
is allocated to each buyer MG, in this case, 23.19 kW. This is 
because when 𝜇 = 0, EMO does not consider the importance 
of the priority. As we go on increasing the value  𝜇 , the  
Fig.2. Number of microgrids versus the average convergence time for   
Algorithm 1 
 
Fig.3. Number of microgrids versus the average convergence time for    
Algorithm 2 
 
Fig.4. Effect of variation in the weight factor 𝜇 on energy allocated to   
buyer MG’s  
 
energy allocation gap also goes on increasing until the buyer 
with the higher priority gets saturated to its maximum.  
In order to highlight the benefits of the proposed 
mechanism, the results are also compared with the Multi-
leader Multi-follower (MLMF) based distributed mechanism 
suggested in [17] as simulation setup is close to the proposed 
method. The optimal bid placed by BAA during various 
trading intervals is shown in Fig. 5.  It is interesting to note 
that in both methods, optimal bids are within the limits i.e. 
𝐺 ≤  𝜌 ≤  𝐺  . In MLMF method [17] optimal bid 
monotonically increases with the number of buyer MGs. In 
worst case of two buyer MGs i.e. in block 4, the optimal bid 
for [17] turns out to be only 0.8/kWh which is equal to the 
grid buying price. In almost all blocks, the bid placed by BAA 
using proposed method is higher than the MLMF method. 
This in turn encourages seller MGs to share more portion of 
their excess energy with the buyers and also increases utility 
of seller MGs.  
Figures 6 to 9, shows the energy allocation to the buyer 
MGs during various trading intervals.  In MLMF [17] method, 
each buyer receives the equal share of the excess energy. 
Thus, there is no distinction among the buyer MGs. Also, 
irrespective of the load demand, each buyer MG receives the 
equal share of the excess energy. Contrast to this, in the 
proposed mechanism, the energy is allocated to individual 
buyer MG proportional to its priority factor which in turn 
depends on its local load demand and past contributions  
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TABLE III
OVERALL ENERGY TRADING SCENARIO IN A DISTRIBUTED NETWORK OF SIX MICROGRIDS 
 
(-) indicates energy imported from the main grid and (+) indicates energy exported to the main grid 
 
 
Fig.5. Optimal bid placed by BAA during various trading intervals 
 
Fig.6 Energy requirement and energy allocated to various buyer MGs 
in block interval 1 
 
Fig.7 Energy requirement and energy allocated to various buyer MGs 
in block interval 2 
 
Fig.8 Energy requirement and energy allocated to various buyer MGs 
in block interval 3 
 
 
recorded and limited to its maximum demand. Thus, unlike 
the method in [17], the proposed method ensures proactive 
energy sharing among local MGs clusters. 
The excess energy available for trade during various trading 
intervals is shown Fig. 10. Unlike the reported work [17]-[19], 
we have paid attention to the seller strategies as well.  As a  
 
Fig.9 Energy requirement and energy allocated to various buyer MGs 
in block interval 4 
 
Fig.10 Excess energy available with seller MGs at various trading 
intervals 
 
Fig.11 Total cost incurred to BAA while fulfilling buyers demand during   
various trading intervals 
 
Fig.12 Total revenue earned by seller MGs during various trading 
intervals 
 
result, sellers are allowed to use some portion of the excess 
energy for running their own elastic loads. Therefore, even 
after using some portion of excess energy for running elastic 
load, the remaining energy available for trade is close to the 















Optimal strategy of 
Buyer MGs 













1 57.15 [0 0 30 50 20 0] [0 0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0] [ 0 0 15.46 33.27 8.42 0]  [ 0 0 15.46 33.27 8.42 0]  -42.85 
2 92.77 [40 0 0 60 30 30] [0.45 0 0 0.38 0.19 0.39] 
[32.47 0 0 25.20 8.90 
26.20]  
[32.47 0 0 25.20 8.90 
26.20]  
- 67.23 
3 61.96 [0 0 60 20 0 50] [0 0 0.60 0.15 0 0.53] [0 0 31.69 3.96 0 26.31] [0 0 31.69 3.96 0 26.31] - 68.04 
4 121.87 [0 30 0 0 0 50] [0 0.65 0 0 0 0.72] [0 30 0 0 0 50]  [0 30 0 0 0 50]  +41.87 
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incurred to BAA i.e 𝐶  while fulfilling buyers demand 
during various trading intervals is depicted in Fig. 11. As the 
bid placed by BAA using [17] is less than the proposed 
method, the 𝐶   is more for the proposed method. However, 
it is less than the baseline approach. Higher value of 𝐶   
encourages seller MGs to trade larger portion of their excess 
energy in local market. The total revenue earned by seller 
MGs during various trading intervals is shown in Fig. 12. As 
the bid place by BAA using proposed method is higher than 
the MLMF [17] and grid buying price, a substantial 
improvement in the revenue earned by seller MG is observed. 
Thus, proposed method protects the interests of seller MGs as 
well. Also, seller MGs are allowed to run their own elastic 
loads.  
It is interesting to note that in table III, each buyer MG 
follows the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy. Hence, the 
strategy submitted by each buyer MG and energy allocated by 
EMO are always equal as shown in Table III. However, if 
there exist any selfish player who submits other than Nash 
equilibrium solution as strategy, EMO ensures fair energy 
allocation to each buyer MG who follows NE solution based 
on its priority factor. Thus, selfish behavior of any buyer MG 
gets eliminated and the system remains stable. This ensures 
that interests of all buyer MGs also gets protected. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In the proposed method interests of both the seller as well as 
the buyer microgrids are protected by allowing them to decide 
their own strategies to maximize their respective utilities. In 
order to promote local energy trading, incentives are given to 
the seller microgrids in terms of priority in future when they 
need energy from the local market. The seller microgrids are 
also allowed to decide the amount of energy they want to 
share out of their total surplus. The competition among buyer 
microgrids is formulated as a non-cooperative game. The 
existence and uniqueness of NE are also shown. Using 
proposed method, selfish behavior of any buyer microgrid gets 
eliminated. Introduction of simple pricing mechanism 
bypasses the use of complex bidding algorithms. The 
extensive numerical study quantifies the benefits of the 
proposed method as compared to the baseline and MLMF [17] 
method. Moreover, the distributed decision-making capability 
of an individual entity in the proposed framework has further 
reduced the communication overhead to a great extent. 
The future work could focus on studying the effect of 
distributed storage and seasonal weather variation on the 
performance of the multi-microgrid distribution network 
managed using proposed mechanism. 
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